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Process-tracing: some sensible guidelines, but still lacking foundations 
Recently political scientists have debated intensively about the case study methodology. In these 
debates, the so-called process-tracing methodology has acquired a prominent position as tool for 
making causal inferences within a single case study. In contrast to most small-n case study methods 
that are used to make cross-case inferences about causal relationships, process-tracing methods are 
said to allow within-case inferences about the presence or absence of causal mechanisms. Beach 
and Pedersen’s book is the first book-length study of process-tracing methodology, so I was curious 
to see what their synthesis of the political methodology has to offer for sociologists and other social 
scientists. 
Beach and Pedersen begin by distinguishing three kinds of process-tracing. First, theory-testing 
process-tracing starts with an existing account of causal mechanisms and tests whether all parts of 
this mechanism are present in a particular case. Secondly, theory-building process-tracing is focused 
on discovering new causal mechanisms from case-specific empirical evidence. Finally, explaining-
outcome process-tracing aims to construct an explanation for a specific historical case. This 
classification makes a lot of sense: the research purposes, the role of background theory, and the 
conclusions reached are so different that a classification like this is indispensable for making sense 
of process-tracing activities.  
The second central element in Beach and Pedersen’s account is the idea of causal mechanism. In 
chapter 3 and 4 the authors present their account of ontology of causal mechanisms. I found Beach 
and Pedersen’s discussion of causation and mechanisms quite confused. Their discussions of 
indeterminism and ontology of causation would have benefited from reading of standard 
philosophical literature on these topics. Similarly, when Beach and Pedersen analyze causal 
mechanisms in terms of transmission of causal forces, they make unnecessary metaphysical 
commitments. Fortunately, the reader can easily skip most of these philosophical curiosities. For 
example, every time the authors write about causal forces, one can read them as claims about 
transmission of causal influence which is much more neutral (and adequate) notion for their 
purposes.  
The third key element in Beach and Pedersen’s theoretical account is a Bayesian account of 
confirmation which, according to them, provides “the inferential logic” for process-tracing research 
that brings its methodology in line with mechanism-based ontology of causation. I found this claim 
strange: the Bayesian logic of subjective probabilities is compatible with any ontology whatsoever. 
Furthermore, the most of the sensible methodological ideas they present as Bayesian are not in any 
way specific to Bayesian approaches and most definitely they cannot be derived from the Bayes’ 
theorem. Luckily, one can keep their methodological discussion separate from their foundational 
claims.  
However, their case for process-tracing methods would have been stronger without claims about the 
foundational role of the Bayesian confirmation theory. The problem is that the Bayesian theory tells 
that you have to revise your subjective confidence in the light of new evidence, but it does not 
really tell how to evaluate the evidence or what makes it good or objective evidence. These things 
are left to person’s subjective assessment, the theory only requires that you revise your subjective 
probabilities consistently. There is of course a hope that the influence of subjective prior 
probabilities will be washed out once enough evidence is accumulated, but Beach and Pedersen do 
not even attempt to make the case that this could happen in qualitative case study research. This 
subjective focus leaves the door open to those who are skeptical of process-tracing methods to take 
Beach and Pedersen’s Bayesianism as a confirmation of the ultimately subjective nature of process-
tracing evidence. This would be a mistaken conclusion, as I think that process-tracing perspective is 
important not only in qualitative case studies but also in quantitative research. Thus further work on 
conceptual foundations of process-tracing is still needed.  
Setting aside their foundational claims, much of Beach and Pedersen’s discussion of process-tracing 
methodology is quite useful. An example of this is their illuminating discussion of Van Evera’s 
famous classification of the strength of predictive tests based on their ability to discriminate 
between competing hypotheses. They are also refreshingly clear about the limitations of process-
tracing methodology. As they correctly point out, most of the time within-case process-tracing 
needs to be supplemented both with large amounts of theoretical background knowledge, and 
evidence from comparative and statistical research settings. Useful is also their discussion of case-
selection in Chapter 8. To my mind, this is the best chapter in the book. In contrast to other chapters 
– where Beach and Pedersen are mainly focused on specifying what makes process-tracing different 
from other methods – it places process-tracing in the context of larger research process. This kind of 
contextualization is very important for a book that is intended to be used by students.  
In summary, while the book fails in its aim to provide foundations for process-tracing methodology, 
it still serves useful purpose by bringing together many earlier contributions to the debate about 
process-tracing, providing rather comprehensive account of the state of the art. For a sociologist it 
provides a useful summary of political science debates about process-tracing. On the negative side, 
the book gives an impression that is rather hastily put together. Many passages would have 
benefited from rewriting but also from better reading of the cited materials. All examples are from 
international politics, which further reduces the usability of the book in sociological methods 
classes.
